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Introduction 
In a world of well-functioning markets without externalities or government interventions, U.S. 
ethanol production from grains cannot compete with petroleum based fuels at 1989 prices. Sugarcane 
based ethanol (Brazil) is lower cost but still not competitive in the U.S. automotive fuel market at 
current oil prices. To ensure domestic production and usc of corn based ethanol in this unfavorable 
economic setting, an elaborate set of production and use incentives and import disincentives has been 
created. These incentives have fostered the development of a small but significant fuel ethanol industry 
in the U.S. 
The original and mam objective of the fuel ethanol program was to increase energy 
independence. A secondary objective was to raise farmer income. Corn producer organizations strongly 
support continuation and expansion of the ethanol program. Because of the modest size of the program, 
(800 million gallons per year) benefits for the farm sector from the current ethanol program are small. 
The phaseout of lead (octane additive) and concerns over meeting Clean Air Act emission requirements 
are creating a growing potential premium market for ethanol which could increase demand, raise price, 
and thus lower needed subsidy levels. 
Future tax, supply, and price changes for imported petroleum may also reduce the subsidy 
support level necessary to make ethanol competitive in the automotive fuel market. A related 
opportunity is that Brazil with a comparative advantage in ethanol production from sugarcane and a 
comparative disadvantage in corn production presents an alternative growth market for corn through 
potential bilateral trade agreements in corn and ethanol. 
In the U.S. agricultural sector, the government, through the political process, has chosen to 
intervene to support farm income through various instruments influencing supply and demand. Given 
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that neither free markets nor mandatory supply control appear to be politically acceptable for major 
farm commodities, the government is likely to continue to rely on voluntary acreage diversion programs 
to maintain farm income. The government also is likely to continue to stimulate demand for farm 
output through domestic food subsidies such as food stamps, export subsidies and commercial subsidies 
such as tax exemptions for ethanol. 
These instruments to control supply and expand demand are not equally cost-effective in use 
of government outlays to raise farm income. Also, one instrument may be cost effective within a range 
of farm income support but not be cost-effective at the margin. The need to diminish budget deficits 
creates a premium on raising farm income at minimum Treasury cost. 
At issue is what set of policies are most cost effective in enhancing farm income and under what 
circumstances will Treasury costs from intervention to maintain farm income be less by converting grains 
into fuel ethanol (or by trading grains for Brazilian ethanol) than by paying farmers not to produce or 
by some other means to maintain farm income. This is the concept explored in this paper and the 
subject of a proposed research program. 
A brief overview of the U.S. ethanol program is presented first including a description of the 
ethanol incentive policies, cost of production from grains, and a summary of early studies on the 
estimated farm income gains from corn ethanol production. This is followed by a discussion of the 
potential premium market for ethanol as an octane enhancer. Next, a comparative production cost 
analyses is presented for corn, sugarcane and ethanol in Brazil and the U.S. -- including total costs of 
accessing each country's markets. This is followed by a description of U.S. farm income support 
programs. In the final section, a research agenda is outlined to investigate the feasibility of a joint 
agriculture - ethanol minimum Treasury cost program to maintain farm income. 
U.S. Ethanol Program 
The U.S. ethanol program was initiated in 1978 with passage of the national Energy Tax Act 
(PL-618) which granted a four cent per gallon federal excise tax exemption until October 1, 1985 for 
gasoline containing 10 percent ethanol made from biomass. The federal excise tax exemption was later 
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raised to six cents per gallon and extended to 1993. Other benefits to the ethanol program have 
included grants for feasibility studies, investment and other income tax credits, grants of grain from 
Government stocks, participation by alcohol production in the crude oil entitlements program, direct 
loans, and loan guarantees (1, pg 1). 
The six cent tax exemption on a 10 percent blend translates to a 60 cent subsidy per gallon of 
ethanol. Companion tax exemptions in a number of states raised the effective subsidy level on ethanol 
to about 80 cents per gallon or more during much of the 1980's. In 1985 for example, the federal 
subsidies totalled about $500 million and state subsidies $302.5 million (2, pg 70). These subsidies were 
granted to ethanol sales of 793,000 gallons, a subsidy level of more than $1.00 per gallon. In recent 
years, the overall level of state tax exemption has been reduced gradually as some states have eliminated 
or reduced support for ethanol programs. 
Domestic ethanol production and use grew rapidly during the early 1980's but growth has slowed 
since 1985 as gasoline prices declined and political support, both state and federal, was less apparent. 
Also, the nearness of the 1993 cutoff for federal subsidy support along with low ethanol prices has 
discouraged new production initiatives. 
To exclude less expensive imported ethanol from the federal tax subsidy, a compensating 60 
cents per gallon tariff is levied against imported ethanol. Imports were a small but significant ethanol 
supply source during the early 1980's, reaching about 100 million gallons in 1985 or about 12 percent 
of total supply. Subsequent U.S. price declines coupled with growing domestic needs within the Brazilian 
economy where over 90 percent of all new cars have pure ethanol engines have reduced imports to 
negligible levels in recent years. 
Cost of Production 
High and uncertain costs of production which necessitated the government subsidy program 
have continued to limit growth of the ethanol industry. 
Determining an accurate cost profile for the corn ethanol industry is a difficult task. The 
industry has three principal components: the corn feed stock which accounts for over one-half of the 
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production costs, processing the corn into ethanol including the drying of the feed by-products, and the 
credit to the production process from selling by-product feeds. From an agricultural industry 
perspective, the by-product feeds dampen the market for protein feeds such as soybean oil meal. 
The price of corn is determined in the international feed market and is subject to substantial 
price fluctuations depending on weather and other supply and demand conditions throughout the world. 
Processing costs are more stable but vary by plant size, processing energy source and cost, and 
alternative and complementary uses such a corn sweetener production. By-product credits arc in part 
related to corn price through the feed market but, by increasing the total feed supply, by-product sales 
limit considerably the anticipated corn price increase from expanded corn use. This occurs principally 
through the impact on soybean demand and price and thus on the farm level decision to release soybean 
acreage to corn production. Estimates have shown that this substitution of corn for soybean acreage 
can exceed 80 percent in some situations (3, pg 9). 
When each of these factors is taken into account, a wide range of production costs arc possible. 
Cost estimates for major ethanol production facilities in recent years range from $1.20 to $1.60 per 
gallon depending on price of corn. The Economic Research Service of the U.S.DA. estimates that over 
the past six years an average cost of production in the U.S. was about $1.36 per gallon ( 4, 1, pg 7). 
With current corn prices near $3.00 per bushel, ethanol production costs have risen to about $1.45 per 
gallon (5, pg 4). 
Impact on Agriculture, Government Program Costs and Consumers 
Only a few studies have attempted to evaluate the overall economic impact of the ethanol 
program. No studies have incorporated the possibility of bilateral trade in corn and ethanol. The results 
of these studies confirm that ethanol programs raise farm income, especially corn farmers' income, but 
they come to somewhat different conclusions concerning the impact on overall Government costs. 
ERS studied the total costs and benefits of a projected 10-year domestic ethanol program using 
corn as the ethanol feedstock and assuming production levels of 595 million gallons in 1985 and rising 
steadily to 1,058 million gallons by 1995. The results of their analysis were summarized as follows: 
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While additional ethanol production would benefit farmers and offers an opportunity 
to reduce some Government program costs, these gains must be paid for by large 
subsidies to ethanol producers and higher consumer food prices. This analysis suggests 
that ethanol production is a very costly proposition in the United States. Ethanol 
production has little effect on total Government costs. Its major benefit is higher net 
farm income. But increases in consumer food expenditures caused by additional 
ethanol production far exceed the increases in farm income. Consumers would be 
better off if they burned straight gasoline in their automobiles and paid a direct cash 
subsidy to farmers in the amount that net farm income would be increased by ethanol 
production. (6, pg 38). 
A second study by the National Advisory Panel on Cost-Effectiveness of Fuel Ethanol 
Production estimated the impact of a six-year ethanol program that increased from 850 million gallons 
in 1987/88 to 1,700 million gallons by 1992/93. The analysis did not include consumer impacts but did 
measure projected changes in farm income and Government program costs. Summary statements from 
the analysis are as follows: 
The major impact of increased ethanol production will be felt in the corn sub-sector. -
-- ethanol production is projected to increase farm net cash receipts from corn by a 
total of more than $1.2 billion over the next 6 years --- relative to the baseline. 
Savings on federal agricultural program outlays provide an important offset for costs 
incurred in encouraging ethanol production. Net federal outlays, including both 
reductions in farm program costs and additional ethanol excise tax exemption costs, are 
reduce~ by roughly $1 billion over 6 years. (7, pg 3-'213/29) 
Note that both studies report positive results for enhancing farm income through increased ethanol 
production but arrive at contradictory conclusions concerning the impact of the ethanol program on total 
costs. 
The Premium Octane Market 
To date, ethanol has made only limited inroads in the gasoline octane market. Reasons 
accounting for this failure include cost, supply uncertainty, refinery resistance, and incompatibility with 
refinery and pipeline systems. The market price of ethanol has been adversely affected because its value 
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as an octane source would be $0.20-$0.30 per gallon greater than its value as a gasoline substitute. 
Primary use of ethanol as an octane source, of course, would improve substantially the economic 
analyses reported above. 
Several changes in the past few years hold out some promise for a greater role for ethanol in 
meeting future octane pool requirements, and thus improving the economic justification for an ethanol 
industry. These include the phaseout of lead as the principal octane additive, a gradual increase in the 
octane pool requirement as average octane needs rise, problems in meeting the Clean Air Act emission 
requirements, and the development of ETBE as an ethanol based octane additive that can be 
incorporated within refinery and pipeline systems. ETBE is an especially encouraging development 
because it can compete directly with methanol based MTBE which has captured most of the octane 
market void created by the elimination of lead (1, 8, 9, 10). Finally, recent research indicates that the 
efficiency in converting biomass into ethanol can be raised from the current 47 percent to a potential 
95 percent (11, pg Bl). 
These developments are important for several reasons. First, they draw the major refineries 
into the ethanol market, creating a more dependable demand structure. Secondly, this move is 
reinforced by regulations mandating the use of oxygenate fuels in specific geographical settings. Finally, 
the market will pay a higher value for these premium ethanol uses, reducing the required subsidy level. 
For example, Rask and Ahmed estimate that overall ethanol subsidies could be reduced from $0.80 to 
about $0.45 to $0.60 per gallon if ethanol were priced at its octane enhancing value (8, pg 7). The 
possibility of primary use of ethanol as an octane source has not been incorporated in the economic 
analyses reported earlier, but will be included in the research proposed below. 
Bilateral Trade in Corn and Ethanol 
Corn and ethanol markets in Brazil and the U.S. present a striking comparison in terms of costs 
of production and market value, especially when the premium U.S. octane market is considered. 
Basically, Brazil has a low cost, low value ethanol market while the U.S. has a high cost, high value 
ethanol market. In contrast, corn markets arc just the opposite (Table 1). 
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Brazil uses most of it's ethanol as a pure fuel, where its value per gallon is only about 75 
percent that of gasoline. In the U.S. octane market, however, ethanol as noted above will have a value 
20-30 percent greater than gasoline. Thus, by simply moving ethanol from Brazil to the U.S. (at a cost 
of about $0.15 per gallon) its market value can be increased by two-thirds. 
Table 1. Estimated Costs of Producing and Marketing Corn, Wheat, Soybeans, 
and Ethanol - Brazil and United States - 1986. 
Cost 
Brazil 
Farm (Distillery) 
Santos (FOB) 
New Orleans (CIF) 
Tokyo (CIF) 
U.S.A. 
Farm (Distillery) 
New Orleans (FOB) 
Santos (CIF) 
Tokyo (CIF) 
Source: 12 
Corn Wheat Soybeans 
-----------($.MT)------------
$148 $303 $198 
186 344 242 
202 360 258 
220 378 276 
$119 $159 $243 
144 190 268 
160 206 284 
170 216 294 
Ethanol 
($/Liter) 
$.206 
.211 
.248 
$.346 
.359 
.396 
Ethanol costs of production from corn (U.S.) are about 70 percent greater than from sugar cane 
(Brazil). This means that Brazilian ethanol can be shipped to the U.S. and compete effectively in the 
U.S. octane market when petroleum prices reach $26 per barrel (Figure 1). U.S. ethanol will be 
competitive (without subsidy) only when petroleum prices are above $40 per barrel. Market prices are 
unlikely to reach that level in the foreseeable future but a tax on petroleum imports or gasoline at the 
pump would increase the likelihood of reaching that level. 
The U.S. has a cost advantage in the production of corn and can access Brazilian ports at less 
cost than Brazil can move corn from interior production regions to the ports (Table 1). Thus, the U.S. 
is a lower cost corn supplier than is domestic Brazilian production for most corn deficit areas in Brazil. 
Br<~.zil is normally self-sufficient in the production of corn but has been an occasional importer of U.S. 
corn. With an expanding livestock industry, Brazilian corn needs are expected to grow substantially in 
7 
the future. 
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Figure 1. Costs of Alternative Octane Sources to U.S. Refineries at Current Capacities - 1987. 
Source: 12 
As noted earlier, Brazil supplied up to 100 million gallons of ethanol annually to the U.S. in the 
early 1980's when oil prices were higher, while paying an import duty equivalent to the U.S. federal 
subsidy.· A supplementary issue in the proposed research is whether a bilateral agreement to trade 
specified quantities of corn and ethanol would enhance U.S. farm income without increasing Treasury 
costs. 
Farm Income Support Programs 
Since 1933 the federal government has committed itself to maintain farm income, especially 
grain producers' income. The principal means used to maintain income has been acreage diversion but 
other means have been employed including stock accumulation, direct payments, and demand expansion. 
Ethanol production is one form of demand expansion. At a federal subsidy of approximately one-half 
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billion per year in the mid-1980s, it was dwarfed by other farm income support programs costing the 
Treasury over $20 billion in some years. 
As noted earlier, the various types of commodity programs are not equally cost-effective in 
making limited government funds go far to enhance farm income. Direct payments to producers raise 
farm income approximately $1 for each Treasury dollar spent. Stock accumulation raises farm income 
but stock depletion depresses income, hence on average stock policy outlays while reducing variability 
do little to raise average farm income over time. Acreage reduction programs have a dual impact on 
farm income: (1) diversion payments plus (2) farm receipts enhanced by lesser output pressing an 
inelastic demand. Slippage in diversion programs is very large from diverting inferior land, application 
of more inputs on nondiverted acres, and other sources. Consequently, acreage reduction payments that 
in theory should raise farm income $4 per Treasury dollar in fact raise farm income only $1.50 to $2.00 
(14, pg. 493). 
Demand expansion through ethanol production has several advantages in addition to raising 
farm income. First, it avoids the obvious subsidy of direct payments and the objections of producers 
who feel less than comfortable about receiving acreage diversion payments "to not produce". Ethanol 
also has the advantage of octane and environmental enhancement noted earlier. However, while 
previous studies have confirmed that using corn for ethanol production does raise farm income, 
especially corn farmers' income, they come to somewhat different conclusions concerning the impact of 
overall government and consumer costs. At issue is under what circumstances ethanol can be cost-
effective compared to other income enhancement measures and, if it is not, do the nonpecuniary 
advantages of ethanol production compensate. 
The attractiveness of ethanol production is in part a function of the degree of excess production 
capacity defined as farm production in excess of what the market will absorb at politically acceptable 
prices. Excess capacity averaged approximately 5 percent of normal (weather adjusted) production in 
the 1960s and 1980s (15, pg. 12). Excess capacity currently is lower, making ethanol production as a 
"commodity program" less feasible. Obviously, the degree of expected future excess capacity is a factor 
to consider in determining the feasibility of ethanol production. 
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A Research Agenda 
A major objective of this analysis is to determine under what circumstances of production 
capacity, farm income support, petroleum prices, and technical constraints ethanol production becomes 
a cost-effective instrument for government to maintain net farm income above that of a free market. 
Specifically, the model outlined in the Appendix is designed to determine the optimal mix of acreage 
diversion, direct deficiency payment, export subsidy, and ethanol subsidy programs that minimize 
government cost of holding net farm income from feed grain and soybeans at a prescribed level. 
Alternatively, the problem could be stated as enhancing income of corn and soybean producers with an 
optimal combination of public programs subject to a Treasury budget constraint. Food aid programs 
for domestic consumers (food stamps) and for foreign consumers (PL 480) arc not assumed to be 
influenced by the ethanol program. 
Figure 2 illustrates some possible policy options for raising income of feed producers given 
domestic supply of feed S, domestic demand for livestock feed OF (here assumed to be perfectly 
inelastic), and demand for ethanol DE added horizontally to Dp In the absence of market intervention, 
total demand DFaDE intersects S at market price p and quantity q of which qF is for feed usc and q-
qF is for ethanol production. Gross revenue is pq and net revenue is area 7 + 8 + 9 if the area beneath 
S is total variable cost. 
Suppose this net farm revenue is deemed by the political process to be too low. One option 
is for the government to use a paid diversion program to raise the market price to p1 by paying 
producers rent 2 + 3 + 7 equal to the difference between the cost of production and the market price to 
reduce what would have been production at q1 to the lower quantity qF. Gross revenue then is p1qF plus 
2+3+7. Compared to the free market outcome, net revenue is increased by area 1 from the domestic 
market plus 2 + 3 from diversion payments plus production cost savings of area 6 + 11. Net income would 
be even higher to the extent that government pays more than the minim urn (area 2 + 3 + 7) required to 
induce producers to cut production to qp 
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Figure 2. Supply and Demand Curves for Feed Grain Illustrating Alternative Policy Scenarios to Raise 
Farm Income. 
Under the above scenario of government intervention, the ethanol market was foregone to 
obtain higher prices. An alternative scenario is to subsidi7.e utilization q1-qF in the ethanol market to 
bring total utilization to q1 at price p1 so that no production need be diverted. If the government 
discriminates to pay the minimal cost of utilization of ethanol, the subsidy would be area 3 + 4 in Figure 
1. Gross farm revenue would be p1q1 if the government paid producers p1 for grain used to produce 
ethanol and delivered it to ethanol producers at the minimal discriminating demand price along DE. Net 
revenue in excess of the free market scenario would be only 1 + 2 + 3 because production costs would be 
higher than in the scenario of paid diversion. In reality, the government probably would not 
discriminate price among ethanol users so the subsidy might need to be area 2+3+4+5+6+7 or even 
higher. Some of this additional government outlay might go to feed grain producers and some to 
ethanol producers. 
The situation becomes more complex when recognition is made of alternatives such as direct 
payments or of market channels such as exports. Alternative assumptions regarding the generosity of 
government payments also can give different results. An additional complication is that ethanol 
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production provides a byproduct of high-protein corn gluten feed which displaces some soybean meal 
utilization -- this too needs to be accounted for. A mathematical model accommodating these 
interactions and alternatives is called for. One approach is the Lagrangian formulation detailed in the 
Appendix (An alternative is a linear programming formulation.) 
Appendix 
The Model and Data Sources 
The following feed grain-soybean model assumes that net farm income is maintained at some 
level Kat minimum government program cost by an optimal combination of voluntary acreage di,·ersion, 
export subsidy, ethanol subsidy, and direct payments to farmers. The model assumes that the 
government docs not discriminate subsidies within a given market but pays a subsidy per unit on all 
ethanol or export utilization on grain equal to the subsidy required on the marginal unit. Feed grain 
can be expressed in corn-equivalent units. 
Equations 
(1) Minimize 
(2) Subject to 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
C=C0 +CE+Cx+D 
(Government cost) 
NFI = P FOF + P nOn + D - WF - W n ~ K 
(Net farm income restraint) 
OF= OFS = OFD 
(Feed market clearing condition) 
OFS = fs(PF) 
(Supply function for feed grain, corn equivalent) 
OFD = OFL + OFE + Or·x + OFG 
(Sum of grain demands) 
OFL = fL(PF) 
(Feed grain demand function for livestock feed) 
OFE = fE(PE) 
(Ethanol demand function for feed grain) 
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(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
Pa = PF- TF. 
(Ethanol subsidy TEper unit) 
OFX = fx(Px) 
(Export demand function for feed grain) 
Px = PF- Tx 
(Export subsidy Tx per unit of grain) 
OFG = fa(Ta) 
(Grain production diverted by government programs) 
TG = fn(PF) 
(Government diversion cost per unit as function of grain market price) 
Oa = Oas = Oao 
(Soybean market clearing condition) 
Ons = fb(Ps) 
(Soybean supply function) 
Ono = OnFE - aQFE 
(Quantity of soybeans demanded adjusted for protein substitute equivalent from 
ethanol aQFE) 
OoFE = fh(P o) 
(Soybean and high-protein demand function) 
Ca = TaOFG 
(Treasury cost of feed grain paid diversion) 
Ca = TeOa 
(Treasury cost of feed grain ethanol program) 
Cx = TxOx 
(Treasury cost of feed grain export program) 
D = (T.- PF)(QFL + QFE + Ql•X) 
(Treasury cost of direct payment program) 
WF = fWF(QFL + QFE + QFX) 
(Feed grain production expense function) 
W8 = fwu(08 ) 
(Soybean production expense function) 
Lagrangian Expression 
Instrumental variables TID Tx, T0 , and T. 
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Definition of Variables 
C = Government cost of grain programs 
Ca = Government cost of paid diversion 
C8 = Government cost of ethanol subsidy 
Cx = Government cost of export subsidy 
D = Government cost of direct (deficiency) payments 
NFI = Net farm income from feed grain and soybeans 
P F = Market price of feed grain 
OF = Quantity produced and marketed of feed grain 
P8 = Market price of soybeans 
0 8 = Quantity produced and marketed of soybeans 
WF = Total production cost of feed grain 
W8 = Total production cost of soybeans 
QFS = Quantity supplied of feed grain 
Oro = Quantity demanded of feed grain 
QFL = Quantity demanded of feed grain for livestock feed 
QFE = Quantity demanded of feed grain for ethanol 
QFX = Quantity demanded of feed grain for export 
Oro = Quantity of feed grain diverted under paid diversion 
P 8 = Price of grain for ethanol production 
T 8 = Ethanol subsidy per unit of grain 
Px = Price of grain for export 
T x = Export subsidy per unit of grain 
Ta = Government cost per unit of grain diverted by paid acreage diversion 
T. = Target price for grain 
0 88 = Quantity supplied of soybeans 
0 80 = Quantity demanded of soybeans 
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Q8FE = Quantity of soybean and high-protein demand 
Critical Behavioral Functions and Parameter Estimates 
Critical behavioral functions in the model include: 
(a) the supply function for feed grain (equation 4) 
(b) the demand function for feed grain for domestic feed (equation 6) 
(c) the demand function for feed grain for ethanol (equation 7) 
(d) the export demand function for feed grain (equation 9) 
(e) government grain acreage diversion cost (equation 12) 
(f) the supply function for soybeans (equation 14) 
(g) the soybean-high protein demand (equation 16) 
(h) the feed grain production expense (equation 21) 
(i) the soybean production expense (equation 22) 
To the extent possible, the study will rely on previously estimated parameters for these 
functions. 
Supply Functions for Feed Grain and Soybeans 
Supply response parameters from numerous sources have been summarized for a number of 
farm commodities by Henneberry (17, pg. 177). Estimates for corn vary considerably by source but 
elasticities average approximately .25 in the short run and 1.00 in the long run. Short-run soybean supply 
elasticity estimates average higher, approximately .50. Econometric models (see 18) prO\ide additional 
estimates of supply responses. 
Feed and Export Demand Functions for Feed Grain and Soybeans 
Domestic and export elasticities of demand for feed grain and soybeans are available from 
various sources (see 14, 19, 20). Numerous existing econometric models designed to predict economic 
outcomes for the U.S. and/or world agricultural economies under alternative policy scenarios also 
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provide supply and demand parameter estimates. These are described briefly below. 
These models include the system of linked submodcls developed by the Food and Agriculture 
Program at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxemburg, Austria (21 ). 
This base linked system (BLS) model is a dynamic equilibrium framework for projecting world trade 
and prices of nine agricultural commodities. 
The Grain-Livestock-Sugar (GLS) model is a dynamic, partially equilibrium model that 
simulates 30 countries and 7 commodities including wheat, feed grains, and rice (22). GLS was 
commissioned by the World Bank and developed by the Australian National University and the 
University of Adelaide. 
AGSIM is an annual, dynamic econometric model of regional crop and livestock production in 
the United States. Export and import demand equations are used to link the U.S. with the rest of the 
world. Taylor (23) outlines the present version of AGSIM; a previous version is outlined by Collins and 
Taylor (24). 
The Ministerial Trade Mandate (MTM) model was commissioned by the Secretariat of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (25). The model system is constructed 
around individual country models which capture domestic supply and demand responses. The Static 
World Policy Simulation (SWOPSIM) model was developed by the International Economics Di\ision 
of the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (26). SWOPSIM consists of 
an array of spreadsheets which define country and commodity parameters in relationships including 
supply, demand, and net trade equations for individual countries and country groupings. 
The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (27) model is a dynamic, econometric 
formulation consisting of a series of integrated submodcls including grains and soybeans. AGMOD is 
a relatively small-scale, annual, econometric model adapted for usc on microcomputers (28). The model 
developed at Michigan State University includes grains and soybeans. POL YSIM is a simulation model 
using direct and cross elasticities to determine policy-induced changes in prices and other variables from 
base line projections (29, 30). 
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The above models in many cases rely on judgment or consensus estimates of supply and demand 
parameters from previous studies but provide a rich source of parameter estimates for the proposed 
analysis. 
Fann Expense Functions 
Annual farm operating expenses as related to farm production have been estimated by White, 
Tweeten, and Pinstrup-Andersen {16). The equations are outdated but can be made current using data 
from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (31, 32). 
Diversion Cost Functions 
Government costs of paid acreage diversion programs depend on the production marketed, 
prices received by farmers, and costs of production. In general, Treasury costs rise per unit of grain 
removed as production is diverted on more productive land. Various estimates have been made of the 
diversion payments required per unit of production both on an average and marginal cost basis {16, pg. 
131). In addition, Zepp and Sharples (33) have estimated national and regional costs of land retirement 
based on discriminatory payments to remove the most production per dollar of program outlay as well 
as based on uniform payments per acre. Value of production removed per program dollar generally 
ranges from a minimum of 1.0 to 2.0. However, previous estimates are outdated and need re\ision 
based on recent data. 
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